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Contracts for Religious Education of Children
Jack F. Smith*
R ECENTLY, IN THE SixTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO (the
members of the Eighth District sitting by designation), an
interesting decision was rendered in the case of Hackett v.
Hackett.' The facts in that case were as follows: a separation
agreement had been entered into by a Catholic husband and a
Protestant wife which provided, inter alia, that the wife was to
have custody of the child, who was to be brought up in the
Catholic faith. The separation agreement was subsequently in-
corporated into a divorce decree. The wife did not carry out the
proviso regarding the religious education of the child, and the
husband instituted an action to have the wife held in contempt
of court for her disregard of that provision of the divorce decree.
The husband's action was denied and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals, speaking through Skeel, J., held that
a contract provision that children were to be raised in a par-
ticular faith was unenforceable. This decision is in line with
the great weight of authority in the United States today.2 The
majority of cases involve antenuptial agreements which provide
* B.B.A., Fenn College; LL.B., LL.M., Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
Associate Professor of Law, and Librarian, Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
former Law Clerk of Ohio Court of Appeals, 8th Distr.; member of the
Ohio Bar; etc.
I Gloria T. Hackett v. John W. Hackett, Jr., Lucas County, decided May 19,
1958.
2 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Sup. 278, 132 A. 2d 420 (1957). "The
law is absolutely impartial in matters of religion. A court will not take a
child's religious education into its own hands short of circumstances
amounting to unfitness of the custodian, and in a dispute relating to
custody, religious views afford no ground for removing children from the
custody of a parent otherwi-e qualified." Donahue v. Donahue, 61 A. 2d
243 (N. J., 1948). The facts in this case were interesting. The father was
born and reared a Catholic, the mother was Jewish. Their marriage was
the second for each of them, their respective prior marriages having been
terminated by divorce. They were married in a Lutheran Zion Church. At
some point, the father embraced Christian Science. Two children were born
of the marriage. The boy was enrolled in a Christian Science Sunday
School at the age of three and attended on some twelve occasions during
the ensuing six years. The girl was baptized a Catholic at the instance of
the father, without the knowledge or consent of the mother, while the
mother and father were living apart. At the time of the marriage and for
some time prior thereto, the children were living with the mother and her
father, who was a devout adherent of the Jewish faith. The mother was
awarded custody in the divorce proceedings and the father subsequently
brought an action to have the children raised in a Christian faith. Refused.
Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 P. 307 (1920); Wojnarowicz v. Wojnaro-
wicz, 48 N. J. Super. 349, 137 A. 2d 618 (1958).
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that any children of the marriage are to be raised in a particular
faith.
Usually the religion involved is Roman Catholicism. Roman
Catholics are taught that marriage is a sacrament which must
be administered by a Roman Catholic priest. The Catholic
church frowns upon so-called mixed marriages-where each of
the parties is an adherent of a different religion. But, human
nature being what it is, there is no way to forestall such a mar-
riage effectively.
When a mixed marriage involves a Roman Catholic, the
Catholic, having been taught that he must be married by a priest,
requests his parish priest to perform the ceremony. The priest
insists upon a talk with the other party to the marriage, and as
a condition for his consent secures a promise from the non-
Catholic that any children born as issue of the marriage will be
brought up in the Catholic faith.
If possible, this -promise is reduced to writing in the form
of an antenuptial agreement. This explains why the majority of
cases involving the religious education of children arise out of
the failure of a promissor to abide by the provisions of an ante-
nuptial rather than a separation agreement. 3
In the not too distant past, when our society was more of a
patriarchy than it is today, the father's wishes as to religious
training prevailed. Where the father hadn't made any wishes
known as to a particular faith, the courts assumed that he
wanted his children reared in his own faith even though he did
not actively practice it. 4
But today the courts of the United States almost uniformly
hold that the parent having custody ofa child or children can
select the religious faith to be taught to the child or children,
even though they may have previously promised to rear the
child or children in a particular faith.
In practically every decision, holding such prior promises to
be unenforceable, the courts cite the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and/or the applicable provi-
sion of the state Constitution.5 The religious freedom guaranteed
3 50 Yale L. J. 1286 (1940-41).
4 29 Harv. L. R. 485 (1915-16).
5 Article I, Section 7, Ohio Constitution, in part provides: "All men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship,
against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any
religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience
be permitted .. "
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/17
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by the Constitution has been upheld also in custody cases, where
one parent attempted to show that the religion of the other made
that other unfit to have custody.6
It is believed, however, that there is a more practical reason
for the decisions. How could any court enforce a provision in an
antenuptial or separation agreement that a child was to be raised
in a particular faith? Children, at least in their more formative
years, place more trust and confidence in their parents than they
do in strange teachers. If one parent has custody and the courts
force that parent to send the child to a particular denomina-
tional school or Sunday School, whatever the child learns at
that school can very easily be nullified by the actions and teach-
ings of the custodial parent. There is no effective method of in-
suring, by a court, that a child will be raised in a particular
faith which is not followed by the parent having custody. Courts
refuse to be placed in the position of issuing vain decrees.
There is also another basis for refusing to judicially enforce
contracts regarding the religious education of children in a par-
ticular faith. The action is brought on the contract and, as we
have seen, specific performance cannot be obtained because
such a decree would be a vain act. An action on a contract, if
not for specific performance, is for damages. What damages have
been suffered by a parent out of custody because the custodial
parent has failed to live up to the terms of the antenuptial or
separation contract? Even though he may be concerned regard-
ing the eternal salvation of his child's soul, his damage is only
mental distress. To collect for that distress would require a
judicial holding that his religion was the true religion and that
all other faiths were false and leading to eternal damnation. It is
hard to conceive of any court in this country rendering such a
decision.
One court has refused to enforce a contractual provision re-
garding the religious education of a child, on the ground that the
provision, which was that the child be reared a Roman Catholic,
was unenforcible for vagueness.7
6 Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P. 2d 705 (1957); the mother was
awarded custody of three children. The father appealed, claiming that the
mother was emotionally upset and a Jehovah's Witness. "Religious freedom,
as guaranteed by the Constitution, should be faithfully upheld in deter-
mining custody of children of divorced parents, and religious teachings of
one of the parents to the children, regardless of how obnoxious the teach-
ings may be to the court, the other parent, or the general public, should not
and must not be considered as the basis of making the child custody
orders."
7 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N. W. 2d 491 (Iowa, 1956). This case is a master-
(Continued on next page)
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Perhaps the best basis for the judicial refusal to enforce a
contractual provision that a child be reared in a particular faith,
over the objection of the parent having custody, is that the wel-
fare of the child should be the primary consideration of the
court."
Ordinarily, there is nothing that leads to more friction in a
home than a difference in religion on the part of the occupants
of the home. This is the reason why most religions frown upon
mixed marriages and why marriage counselors advise against
them.
A child's welfare is best advanced by his living in harmony
with the parent who has been awarded his custody. He is already
disturbed by being deprived of one parent. To enforce a con-
tractual provision regarding his religious education, over the
objection of the custodial parent, would add to his disturbance
because that objection would necessarily be known to him. If
the child followed the religious teachings, there would have to
be a lack of harmony between him and the objecting custodial
parent.
Interestingly enough, while on the subject of custody, courts
have changed custody where the custodial parent made no pro-
vision for religious education of the child.9
Another basis for the judicial refusal to enforce a contract
provision regarding the religious education of a child in a par-
ticular faith was utilized in the Hackett case-the lack of "con-
sideration" for such a promise.
(Continued from preceding page)
piece of selecting a result and then finding a premise to support it. The
parties were married and had two sons. Subsequently, they were divorced
after entering into a stipulation that one child was to be awarded to the
wife, who agreed to raise him in the Roman Catholic religion. The wife
was a Protestant, the husband a Catholic. The husband filed contempt pro-
ceedings against the wife, claiming that she had not been complying with
the stipulation which was incorporated into the decree. The court said that
inasmuch as contempt proceedings were quasi-criminal that the wife could
not be held in contempt of an order which was vague, and that the stipula-
tion that the child was to be reared in the Roman Catholic religion was
too vague to enforce.
s Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S. E. 2d 289 (1957). The child's wel-
fare usually controls custody rights, while contracts as to religious training
do not bind the parent having custody.
9 Murphy v. Murphy, 143 Conn. 600, 124 A. 2d 891 (1956): When two
children were involved, one given into the mother's custody and one into
the father's, the mother's later excommunication on remarriage, with no
religious education provision for the child in her care, resulted in award
of custody of that child to the father.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/17
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In the language of Judge Skeel (the members of the Eighth
Appellate District sat by designation in the Sixth District):
"Certainly it cannot be contended that there was any considera-
tion or benefit flowing to the plaintiff from such promise insofar
as the wife's ability to secure a decree in the divorce action was
concerned as contended by the defendant. A husband or wife
is not entitled to a divorce without judicial proof of some breach
of the marital duty as provided by law on the part of a party
to such relationship .... So that the defendant's claim, that the
plaintiff was 'able to obtain a divorce and custody without con-
test by virtue of the Separation Agreement,' has no foundation
in fact or law."
To advert to the Constitutional provisions, both federal and
state, which guarantee freedom of religious choice, at what age
may one insist upon this freedom? May a child, who is in the
custody of a parent complying with the terms of an antenuptial
or separation agreement providing for his religious education in
a particular faith, insist upon changing his religion? The writer
knows of only one case where that question, was presented.'0
The majority of the New York court there held that a twelve
year old boy, who was being raised as a Catholic by his mother,
who had been awarded his custody in accordance with an ante-
nuptial agreement, could attend a church of his own choice. One
judge dissented because there was no evidence that the boy was
damaged, mentally, physically or in any other way by his reli-
gious training, and also on the ground that to permit a youth of
twelve to decide what religion he would follow and to make
that decision binding on the Supreme Court and his parents did
not accord with reason.
The case points up the difficulty of enforcing a contractual
provision for the religious education of children in a particular
faith. But, at the same time, it is questionable whether a twelve
year old boy could resolve a problem which has occupied some
of the best minds of all times-which is the best religion or the
only religion.
Now and then a case is reported which appears to be a
throw-back to the old English rule mentioned at the beginning
of this article-that the father's wishes as regards religious
training should prevail. Such a case is Ex Parte Kananack."1
The wife had obtained a divorce in Florida, prior to which the
10 Martin v. Martin, 308 N. Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (1954).
11 272 App. Div. 783, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (1947).
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parties had entered into a stipulation which was made a part of
the divorce decree. The pertinent portion of the decree was that
the child should be raised or given religious training subject to
the approval of both the husband and wife. The husband and
wife were of diverse religious beliefs. The husband filed a habeas
corpus action in New York to secure custody of the child, and
at a hearing before a referee it was provided that the child
should attend a certain Sunday School in accordance with the
wishes of the wife. The Appellate Division reversed, claiming
that as neither party was unfit to have custody of the child, the
order which directed attendance by the child at a specified
church or Sunday School, contrary to the wishes of the father,
was error.
The Hackett case involved a separation agreement and the
argument that the divorce was uncontested in reliance upon the
separation agreement. This argument was struck down by the
court, which said that the statutory grounds for divorce still had
to be present, so that there was no consideration for the con-
tractual promise to raise the child in a particular faith. Yet, a
question arises:
Suppose that it was not the divorce that was uncontested in
reliance upon such a contractual promise, but that a wife did
not seek custody of a child because of such a promise on the
part of a husband. Assuming that she was a fit person, but fore-
bore to assert her right to custody because of that promise, does
her forebearance amount to consideration? It is submitted that
it does. Even so, the courts probably would still refuse to en-
force the proviso regarding religious education.
As has been said, most of the cases involve Catholics, for the
reasons mentioned. Where the marriage would not take place
at all, except for an antenuptial agreement that any children of
the marriage would be reared as Catholics, is the marriage in-
duced by the promise? One New York court has said "yes," and
held the contract to be enforceable.12
It is clear that the English rule, that the father decides the
particular faith in which his children are to be raised, has been
almost completely discarded in the United States. Our courts
12 Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 337 (1947): "Where wife's prenuptial
agreement that children of the marriage should receive religious training in
husband's religion, was an inducing cause of the marriage, the agreement
was an enforceable contract which would be upheld in wife's separation
action."
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/17
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adopt the theory that if the person awarded custody is a fit per-
son, so that a motion for a change of custody does not lie, then
that person has the right to raise the child in any religion, re-
gardless of any prior promises.
That is the rule in Ohio as laid down in the Hackett case,'
3
and in most states.
13 Angel v. Angel, 2 Ohio Opinions 2d 136 (1956): "Ohio courts have no
authority to order either the person having custody or visitation rights to
direct or prevent any particular unobjectionable form of worship or lack
of worship, Christian or otherwise."
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